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I want to thank the AIJ and the three reviewers Jerome Feldman, John Taylor, and Don
Perlis for reviewing my book, “On Intelligence”. Perlis’ review speaks of “fascination and
frustration” with my book. He finds it fascinating because I “hint at a potentially unifying
view” of intelligence and he finds it frustrating because the book is “sketchy” and he finds
many of my claims about AI “questionable”. I think I understand Perlis’ frustration and
will use his comments as an introduction to my response.
“On Intelligence” begins with a critique of AI and ends with a description of the fu-
ture of intelligent machines, so one might expect this book is about AI. However, “On
Intelligence” is actually a book about neuroscience and the nature of intelligence. “On In-
telligence” builds upon a premise first proposed twenty five years ago [1], that everything
the neocortex does (vision, hearing, touch, motor planning, language, etc.), is done via a
common algorithm. I deduce from this idea a framework for understanding what the cortex
does (the memory-prediction framework), and I present a detailed proposal for how the
architectural components of the neocortex and thalamus implement this framework (Chap-
ter 6).
If you are looking for a cookbook on how to implement this framework, i.e., how to
build intelligent machines based on my theory, you won’t find it. At the time I wrote the
book I was living in the world of neuroscience, developing a theory of cortex, and I did not
yet have a mathematical formalism for the biological theory. (Although for some readers
what I explained was sufficient for them to get started building systems based on my theory,
more on this later.) What the book does offer, and I believe has never been done before,
is provide a testable explanation for what the cortex does overall and how the detailed
anatomy of the cortex fits within this explanation.
Reactions to my book and the proposals in it have been mixed. Some people view the
book as a collection of old ideas presented in a non-technical way, which at best might
promote interest in this field but otherwise doesn’t move the field much forward. If I am
allowed the liberty of painting the three reviews in this journal with a single brush I would
put them all in this camp. On the other hand, many people claim that “On Intelligence”
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neuroscientists, computer scientists, academics in other fields, Nobel laureates, and even a
few AI researchers. Feldman acknowledges this praise in his review when he asks, “why
are these distinguished scientists rhapsodizing over this book?”
So why has “On Intelligence” received such a divided response? It is difficult to say,
but a contributing factor is that whenever one attempts to cross traditional boundaries,
you run the risk of stepping on some toes while simultaneously appearing ignorant to
experts in their fields of specialty. I am guilty of this in my description of AI. In the book,
I summarize decades of AI and neural network research in only a few dozen pages. In the
case of AI, I focused mostly on the distant past. This is surely not a way to make friends.
My motivation was to paint a background for why a new overall framework is needed and
why we have to look to neuroanatomy, not just for inspiration, but for a set of detailed
constraints that any theory must satisfy. (Although most AI researchers say that AI should
learn from biology, very few AI researchers take this seriously.)
The many people who have given high praise for the book recognize both the need for
a new approach and see the memory-prediction framework as an elegant explanation of
many psychological and neuroscience phenomenon. To these people, the new proposals in
the book overshadow the missing pieces, the “sketchiness” referred to by Perlis.
I will now try to address some of the issues and objections raised by the reviewers. At
the end of my response I will give an update on the theory since the book was written.
Taylor is in general agreement with the approach I espouse towards understanding the
brain. You start with global principles and work toward the local. He believes I get off
track by ignoring the importance of attention, not modeling reward mechanisms, and by
my delegation of consciousness to a supporting role. I agree that attention is an essential
component of perception and planning. However there are many critical components of a
theory of intelligence and I had to pick what to focus on and what to defer. To me, you need
to understand how the brain perceives anything before you tackle attention. Still, in Chap-
ter 6 I propose a mechanism for covert attention involving a well known cortical-thalamic
pathway. Admittedly, I give short play to overt attention and attentional priming. These are
areas I am my colleagues are deeply concerned about and my theory addresses, but I de-
cided not to put them into this book given my goal of keeping the book highly readable. As
to reward mechanisms: the brain has a set of structures for evaluating saliency and provid-
ing guidance for what to learn and what to ignore. These reward/emotional structures all
reside outside the cortex. These sub-cortical reward systems communicate with the cortex
by releasing neurotransmitters such as dopamine broadly across the cortex. So if you want
to understand the cortex, which is the only thing I am claiming to do, reward mechanisms
can be viewed as an almost binary signal coming from somewhere else. That is the cortex
doesn’t decide what is good or bad, someone else does and that someone else provides a
simple signal saying “remember this” or “pay attention to this”. Of course if you want to
build a human-like robot you will need to understand and model the sub-cortical reward
systems, but that is not my interest. I make it very clear in the book that modeling the cortex
(and thalamus) alone will not lead to emotional or human-like machines, but it can lead to
machines that are very intelligent even if not human or animal like. As we build machines
that work like the cortex we will need to provide saliency input, but in most applications
this will be a simple matter. I will talk about consciousness when discussing Perlis’ review.
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address most of the questions of interest” to AI and cognitive scientists. On the contrary,
I showed that most matters of interest to AI researchers are handled in the brain by an
elegant common architecture. Illuminating a single biological algorithm that underlies, vi-
sion, hearing, language, robotics, and a host of other intelligent activities is surely relevant
to cognitive scientists. However, if you have spent a lifetime proposing specialized mech-
anisms for different cognitive abilities, as most AI researchers have, you probably won’t
like this idea. Feldman takes issue with my characterization of the cortical algorithm as
a memory system. I tried to make a strong distinction between algorithmic approaches to
vision or language (as often used in AI systems) and the hierarchical memory-based so-
lution as implemented in the cortex. I go to pains to point out that memory in the cortex
is actually a complex affair implemented in a tree-shaped spatial and temporal hierarchy
with several elegant twists occurring at each node in the hierarchy. This is not your typ-
ical idea of what memory is but apparently I didn’t succeed in convincing Feldman, for
he characterizes this as a “simplistic story”. Finally Feldman suggests I take liberty with
facts. He states, “Hawkins starts with some rather detailed facts about cell types and con-
nectivity, but then adds speculative features even in the face of massive contrary evidence.
For example, a great deal is known about motor control and skill memory and it bears no
resemblance to Hawkins’ model. And vision itself is known to involve dozens of cortical
areas with internal structure and interactions.”
In my mind Feldman doesn’t justify his comments about “massive contrary evidence”.
Of course I know that the visual system has many regions that interact, and I am aware
of much of the research in motor control as well as a dozen other capabilities of cortex.
I could have easily described the ventral and dorsal visual pathways and included the clas-
sic Felleman and Van Essen cortical map for Macaque cortex. But it is precisely because
each cortical region is performing the same algorithm that we can focus on the internal
structure of each region and not focus on the details of region to region connectivity. If
you understand the common function of every region and how the hierarchy works, then
you can understand all of what the cortex does without an explicit counting of cortical
regions and their connectivity. For example region to region connectivity in the visual sys-
tem varies remarkably between species and even among phenotypes, but we all see. As I
stated earlier, this theory is the most precise I am aware of when it comes to explaining the
internal details of cortex. When I speculate in the book I say so, but the details I describe
in chapter 6 come from published research and from first hand interviews with neurosci-
entists. I have yet to meet a neuroscientist who claimed I have my facts wrong. I usually
get the opposite reaction. Most are surprised by the depth and detail of this theory and my
personal knowledge. Finally Feldman suggests that perhaps neuroscientists like this theory
because “most neuroscientists don’t think computationally” and “it must be comforting for
biologists to have a computer expert say that we don’t need to deal with computation in
order to understand how the brain creates the mind.” Although it is true that many neuro-
scientists don’t think computationally, almost the opposite can be said of those who like
my book. It is an incorrect characterization of these scientists and of my proposal. As Bob
Constable, Dean of Computer Science at Cornell University said of my theory, “this is a
brain model computer scientists can sink their “algorithmic teeth” in”. Feldman missed
this.
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to the other reviewers and instead focus on issues relevant to AI. Given that “On Intelli-
gence” is a book about neuroscience, Perlis’ review avoids what is the heart of the book’s
content. This is evident when he claims “it is not clear that Hawkins has anything to offer
beyond what is already being done”. Then as evidence he lists several AI and cognitive
psychology concepts that relate to prediction, but which are largely foreign to the world
of neuroscience. What is new in my book is a detailed biological model that unites and
explains all cortical capabilities. Perlis turns a few of my arguments on their head. E.g.,
I argue that the world of AI has focused on the resultant behavior of their programs, ig-
noring what it means for a system to understand its world. This is true of the Turing test,
Big Blue, and it is at the heart of Searle’s Chinese room argument. Perlis counters that it is
much easier to look inside a computer than a brain and AI researchers clearly know what is
going on in their programs. All true, but it misses my point which is that we need a theory
of what it means to understand before deciding whether a machine is intelligent or not.
We should look for an internal metric of intelligence, not external behavior. So many AI
efforts are ad-hoc or specific algorithms to tackle specific problems, leaving out a general
theory of intelligence or perception. At one point Perlis writes, “I know of no one in AI
who thinks we should deliberately ignore findings in neuroscience. The brain is the only
example we have of an intelligent system, and we would be foolish indeed to ignore it”.
Although I hear this said over and over again, the fact is that almost everyone does ignore
the findings of neuroscience. Anatomists have collected volumes of details about the struc-
ture and wiring of the cortex and thalamus. This data is scattered and difficult to assimilate,
but if you do, you get a pretty thorough diagram of cortex and thalamus. This data is like
a blueprint to the brain. If you know how to read it, it provides both guidance towards a
theory and constraints against which any theory can be measured. If you don’t know this
data, and don’t account for it, you are ignoring it. Unfortunately, it takes years of patient
work to read the relevant papers and assemble this knowledge. There are very few people
in the world who have done this.
Finally both Perlis and Taylor take issue with my discussion of consciousness. Both feel
that consciousness needs to play a more central role in a discussion of AI and intelligence.
I tried to make a point in the book that the world of research is divided on this issue. I be-
lieve we should first understand how a brain forms memories, how it uses these memories
to perceive the world, and how it makes predictions. After building this foundation you can
tackle consciousness. It isn’t that consciousness is an epiphenomenon, but it can only be
understood in the context of a solid theory of perception. Others, like Perlis and Feldman,
think that consciousness and qualia “is the problem” and needs to be addressed up front.
I don’t concede this point but I also don’t want to debate it here. Debating consciousness is
like debating politics or religion. I have found that if you want to get something done it is
best to leave consciousness out of the conversation. My proposals on what consciousness
is have resonated with many readers of my book. But as I said, people are divided on this
topic. The way I hope to prove my proposals about consciousness is to build machines that
are unquestionably intelligent and explore consciousness via testable systems.
Which leads me to my last point. When I wrote “On Intelligence” I did not have a
mathematical formulism for the biological theory in the book. I didn’t know how to build
systems that work on the same principles as the biological neocortex, thus the “frustration”
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George, we subsequently developed just such a model. This model is a derivative of belief
propagation. The hierarchical cortex can be understood as a hierarchical Bayesian network
employing several extensions involving sequence memory at each node of the network.
We have built a prototype system and applied it to visual inference. This model has proven
to us that the memory-prediction theory is sound, that it can solve previously unsolved
problems in learning and inference, and that it can be built.
The success of this model led to the formation of a new business called Numenta. Nu-
menta is building a platform and tool set to allow people to build systems designed on
the memory-prediction framework. We are calling the technology Hierarchical Temporal
Memory (HTM). Because of my book there are many researchers throughout the world
who are either already working on similar systems or who want to work with Numenta.
Through Numenta I hope to create something of value to the AI community and reduce the
“frustration” my book has caused. Those interested in following the progress of Numenta
can sign up for email notification at our web site. I am also working on a set of white papers
that explain the mathematical formalism and operation of HTMs.
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